THE OWNERSHIP FALLACY
The ownership fallacy is the ever so bizarre notion which presumes that a belief is part of a person who supports that belief, and, then, from that *false* premise ( the premise which wrongly claims that a belief is somehow part of a person), falsely presumes, therefore, if some person is single-minded in supporting a belief, that one can then (falsely) conclude that such a resolute, single-minded person is somehow (allegedly) supporting themselves, or being selfish.
Alternately, one might also rightly describe the ownership fallacy as: an ever so weird and pathetic notion that presumes that if some person wants everyone else to believe what that person believes, that such a person who wants everyone to believe what they believe, is somehow *allegedly* "selfish" for desiring that others believe what they believe.
Such a ridiculous and mind-boggling, pathetic notion, which presumes thusly, is derived from a bizarre, fast and loose pattern of thinking called: "lateral thinking."
The ownership fallacy *wrongly presumes* that the beliefs that a person supports are part of a person's self, and concludes from such a *false* presumption, that if a person is seeking to serve some belief(s) that person supports, and seeking to serve them in a single-minded, resolute manner that, in doing so, they are, therefore, supposedly serving themselves. Such a fallacy is based on lateral thinking, inasmuch as it presumes that if any item (such as a belief) has a relationship to a person's self, however *indirect*, that indirect relation somehow (*allegedly*) means that the item is then somehow part of the person's self.
Such a conclusion, which is based on the faulty premise that if an item has a relation with a person's self that it is somehow part of the person's self, is, of course, quite a ridiculous conclusion.
Merely because some item has a relationship with a person's self, does *not* mean that such an item is in any way a part of a person's self. A belief can have an indirect relationship with the self of a person who supports that belief, however, the relationship involved is often a merely instrumental relationship, wherein the person acts as a *mere instrument* for that belief. A person can, in acting as an *instrument* for a belief they support, maintain that the belief they support is totally superior to other contrary beliefs, and, yet, think of their personal self as *not* in any way superior at all, and, hence, be totally humble, understanding their personal self as merely having the role of a *mere instrument* for serving the belief, while they are expressing that belief and/or acting to serve the belief.
Believing the belief one supports is superior to contrary beliefs is NOT in any way the same as believing one's personal self is superior to other people. (There is *nothing* at all arrogant about maintaining that a belief one supports is superior to beliefs which are contrary to it, despite the bizarre, relativist propaganda,which has become prevalent in recent decades, which claims somehow that maintaining a belief is superior is somehow supposedly tantamount to arrogance, when clearly it is not.)
The ownership fallacy is aided and abetted by the tendency of people in casual conversation to use *figurative* ownership terms such as: "your", "my", "their", "our", "his", or "her", and, then, act as if they applied to intangibles like beliefs, concepts, principles, ideals and so on.
If people continue to acknowledge that such ownership terms as 'your' (as in figurative expressions such as the phrase: "your beliefs"), or 'their' (as in figurative expressions such as: "their beliefs"), and so on are *not* to be taken literally, they can then help to, thus, prevent the ownership fallacy.
The problem is apparently that many people take such expressions literally *as if* such intangible items were really part of the person that expresses and/or supports them, when clearly they are NOT part of them.
The ownership fallacy is also aided and abetted by the tendency of people (who are influenced by lateral thinking) to *equivocate* the word 'want'. In so doing, they attempt to mix two *separate*, very different, usages of the word ' want', and, then, proceed *as if* such two very different usages of the word 'want ' were somehow the same,when clearly they are *not* the same, at all!
It is important, as a clarification, to present what is known as a *precising definition*, as to what a belief is, in terms of its categorical identity.
A belief is:
a network of representations (or, in the case of false beliefs: mis-representations) which do reflect (in varying degrees) the affirmation, or negation, of propositions (propositions which are themselves, in turn, networks of concepts or metaconcepts).
Neither the beliefs, nor the propositions that make up those beliefs, nor the concepts or meta-concepts which make up those propositions: absolutely *none* of those items, are in any way part of the person which expresses them!
As mentioned before, the ownership fallacy is a pattern of thought which equivocates between two separate uses of the word 'want'. One is the use of the word 'want' that refers a context of desiring something that involves self-aggrandizement (such as physical excitement of a hedonistic sort, or gaining some acclaim for oneself).
The *other use * is a usage of the word which refers to a completely *separate context* of desiring, which does *not* involve self-aggrandizement at all, and is often quite *opposed to* all that which is self-aggrandizing.
Lateral thinking, which gives rise to the fallacy, tries to mix up categorically *different* contexts of how the word 'want' is used.
Wanting that which is self-aggrandizing is qualitatively *totally different* from the sort of wanting which is other directed. The latter seeks an aim that is benevolent to the other(s) * without* any desire of self gain being sought from the ostensible goal of helping the other.
Yet the weird, goofy equivocation, which is extant in the ownership fallacy, tries to mix up such *separate contexts* based on a fast and loose sort of comparison, (fast and loose comparison being that which is the stock and trade of lateral thinking).
Since both completely different sorts of contexts are referenced in the English language by the same word (the word 'want'), it is easy for the person who supports the bizarre pattern of thought called the ownership fallacy to try to mix those completely *separate* contexts for the use of the word 'want', and, thus, make quite goofy, ridiculous claims. It is such a fallacious sort of clam which is offered when someone might utter a ridiculous statement, like unto the following (ridiculous) statement: "Even the altruistic person who wants to help others without wanting anything in return, is selfish because they are doing what they want too, if they want to be altruistic."
Thus, upon analysis, we can note that the ownership fallacy is based on lazy equivocations which weirdly attempt to blur the distinction separating intangibles, (such as beliefs and so on), from the categorically *different context* of the conscious agents which attempt to serve the beliefs, or to express the beliefs.
The ownership fallacy is the ever so bizarre notion which presumes that a belief is part of a person who supports that belief, and, then, from that *false* premise ( the premise which wrongly claims that a belief is somehow part of a person), falsely presumes, therefore, if some person is single-minded in supporting a belief, that one can then (falsely) conclude that such a resolute, single-minded person is somehow (allegedly) supporting themselves, or being selfish.
Alternately, one might also rightly describe the ownership fallacy as: an ever so weird and pathetic notion that presumes that if some person wants everyone else to believe what that person believes, that such a person who wants everyone to believe what they believe, is somehow *allegedly* "selfish" for desiring that others believe what they believe.
Such a ridiculous and mind-boggling, pathetic notion, which presumes thusly, is derived from a bizarre, fast and loose pattern of thinking called: "lateral thinking."
The ownership fallacy *wrongly presumes* that the beliefs that a person supports are part of a person's self, and concludes from such a *false* presumption, that if a person is seeking to serve some belief(s) that person supports, and seeking to serve them in a single-minded, resolute manner that, in doing so, they are, therefore, supposedly serving themselves. Such a fallacy is based on lateral thinking, inasmuch as it presumes that if any item (such as a belief) has a relationship to a person's self, however *indirect*, that indirect relation somehow (*allegedly*) means that the item is then somehow part of the person's self.
Such a conclusion, which is based on the faulty premise that if an item has a relation with a person's self that it is somehow part of the person's self, is, of course, quite a ridiculous conclusion.
Merely because some item has a relationship with a person's self, does *not* mean that such an item is in any way a part of a person's self. A belief can have an indirect relationship with the self of a person who supports that belief, however, the relationship involved is often a merely instrumental relationship, wherein the person acts as a *mere instrument* for that belief. A person can, in acting as an *instrument* for a belief they support, maintain that the belief they support is totally superior to other contrary beliefs, and, yet, think of their personal self as *not* in any way superior at all, and, hence, be totally humble, understanding their personal self as merely having the role of a *mere instrument* for serving the belief, while they are expressing that belief and/or acting to serve the belief.
Believing the belief one supports is superior to contrary beliefs is NOT in any way the same as believing one's personal self is superior to other people. (There is *nothing* at all arrogant about maintaining that a belief one supports is superior to beliefs which are contrary to it, despite the bizarre, relativist propaganda,which has become prevalent in recent decades, which claims somehow that maintaining a belief is superior is somehow supposedly tantamount to arrogance, when clearly it is not.)
The ownership fallacy is aided and abetted by the tendency of people in casual conversation to use *figurative* ownership terms such as: "your", "my", "their", "our", "his", or "her", and, then, act as if they applied to intangibles like beliefs, concepts, principles, ideals and so on.
If people continue to acknowledge that such ownership terms as 'your' (as in figurative expressions such as the phrase: "your beliefs"), or 'their' (as in figurative expressions such as: "their beliefs"), and so on are *not* to be taken literally, they can then help to, thus, prevent the ownership fallacy.
The problem is apparently that many people take such expressions literally *as if* such intangible items were really part of the person that expresses and/or supports them, when clearly they are NOT part of them.
The ownership fallacy is also aided and abetted by the tendency of people (who are influenced by lateral thinking) to *equivocate* the word 'want'. In so doing, they attempt to mix two *separate*, very different, usages of the word ' want', and, then, proceed *as if* such two very different usages of the word 'want ' were somehow the same,when clearly they are *not* the same, at all!
It is important, as a clarification, to present what is known as a *precising definition*, as to what a belief is, in terms of its categorical identity.
A belief is:
a network of representations (or, in the case of false beliefs: mis-representations) which do reflect (in varying degrees) the affirmation, or negation, of propositions (propositions which are themselves, in turn, networks of concepts or metaconcepts).
Neither the beliefs, nor the propositions that make up those beliefs, nor the concepts or meta-concepts which make up those propositions: absolutely *none* of those items, are in any way part of the person which expresses them!
As mentioned before, the ownership fallacy is a pattern of thought which equivocates between two separate uses of the word 'want'. One is the use of the word 'want' that refers a context of desiring something that involves self-aggrandizement (such as physical excitement of a hedonistic sort, or gaining some acclaim for oneself).
The *other use * is a usage of the word which refers to a completely *separate context* of desiring, which does *not* involve self-aggrandizement at all, and is often quite *opposed to* all that which is self-aggrandizing.
Lateral thinking, which gives rise to the fallacy, tries to mix up categorically *different* contexts of how the word 'want' is used.
Wanting that which is self-aggrandizing is qualitatively *totally different* from the sort of wanting which is other directed. The latter seeks an aim that is benevolent to the other(s) * without* any desire of self gain being sought from the ostensible goal of helping the other.
Yet the weird, goofy equivocation, which is extant in the ownership fallacy, tries to mix up such *separate contexts* based on a fast and loose sort of comparison, (fast and loose comparison being that which is the stock and trade of lateral thinking).
Since both completely different sorts of contexts are referenced in the English language by the same word (the word 'want'), it is easy for the person who supports the bizarre pattern of thought called the ownership fallacy to try to mix those completely *separate* contexts for the use of the word 'want', and, thus, make quite goofy, ridiculous claims. It is such a fallacious sort of clam which is offered when someone might utter a ridiculous statement, like unto the following (ridiculous) statement: "Even the altruistic person who wants to help others without wanting anything in return, is selfish because they are doing what they want too, if they want to be altruistic."
Thus, upon analysis, we can note that the ownership fallacy is based on lazy equivocations which weirdly attempt to blur the distinction separating intangibles, (such as beliefs and so on), from the categorically *different context* of the conscious agents which attempt to serve the beliefs, or to express the beliefs.
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